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Campbell v. Campbell:
An Examination of the Original
and Revised Theories of Surge
and Decline
Joseph Gershtenso n
East Carolina University
One of the most consistent patterns in American politics
is the loss of congressional
seats suffered by the presid ent's party in midterm elections . This phenomenon
can
have important , even profound,
implications
for the ope ration of American government.
Unsurprisingly,
then,
considerable
scholarly attention has been devoted to explaining midterm decline . This research examines two of
the competing
theories,
the "original"
and "revised"
theories of surge and decline proposed
by Angus and
James Campbell, respectively.
I outline hypotheses following from each theory and subject them to a series of
empirical tests using data from the American National
Election Studies ' (NES) panel surveys of 1956-60, 197276, and 1992-94. My findings generally favor the original version of the theory.

0

ne of the most consistent patterns in American politics is
the loss of congressional seats suffered by the president's
party in midterm elections . With the exceptions of 1934
and 1998, the number of seats in the House of Representatives
held by members of the presidential party has decreased in every
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midterm contest since 1862. 1 In 1994, the losses suffered by
President Clinton's Democratic Party led to the first Republican
majority in the chamber in forty years. The 1994 case illustrates
the potential implications of the midterm decline phenomenon.
The Republican majority entered the 104th Congress with much
of its membership united behind the nationalized campaign message of the policy package known as the Contract with America.
They intended to lead the way in formulating legislation, forcing
Clinton to react to their agenda. Clearly, relations between the
legislative and executive branches were likely to become more
strained, and this indeed did come to pass, with the budget deadlock of 1995 representing the peak of the antagonism.
While the 1994 case demonstrates the profound implications
for American government that the phenomenon of midterm decline may entail, it should be noted that many instances of offyear losses have not led to a change in the majority party in the
House and the introduction of divided government. Nevertheless,
midterm losses for the president's party will always have potentially important consequences. They can affect inter-branch relations and presidential legislative success since members of the
president's party vote in accordance with his desire more than do
members of the opposition (Aldrich 1995; Fleisher and Bond
2000). In addition, the composition of congressional committees
will invariably change in the aftermath of midterm elections due
to the necessary replacement of departing members. Finally, the
very existence of the midterm loss pattern may exert influence
over which individuals choose to run for office in the first place.
1
The 1902 elections also represent an exception to the strict pattern of midterm seat loss.
In the elections of that year, the Republicans gained 9 seats in the House of Representatives. However, this gain actually represents a relative loss in comparison to the 25 seats
gained by the Democrats in that year. Increases by both parties were made possible by an
increase in the total number of seats in the wake of the 1900 census.

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE

3

CAMPBELL V. CAMPBELL

Because politicians are strategic actors (Jacobson and Kernell
1983), the party not controlling the presidency may field stronger
candidates in midterm elections.
Given the wide range of possible implications of midterm
losses, it is not surprising that political scientists have devoted
considerable attention to the phenomenon. Research on midterm
decline typically involves aggregate analyses attempting to explain the magnitude of the presidential party's seat change (loss)
and to forecast outcomes of impending midterm elections. At the
risk of oversimplification, I group the literature into two major
categories, coattails and referenda theory. Both emphasize national-level variables in contrast to the focus on local variables
such as candidate assessments and campaign spending •found in
most general analyses of congressional elections (e.g.
Abramowitz and Segal 1992; Gronke 2000; Hermson 2000; Jacobson 2001; Krasno 1994).
Scholars of the coattails tradition point to the influence of
presidential vote choice on voters' decisions over congressional
candidates. Because some citizens vote for candidates of their
preferred presidential candidate's party in other races on the ballot, the president carries some of his fellow partisans into office
with him. Midterm elections remove the possibility of the presidential coattail effect, and the president's party consequently suffers. The magnitude of their losses will depend on the strength of
the coattail effect in the preceding presidential election and the
"exposure" of the party (Born 1990; Campbell 1960; J. Campbell
1985, 1993, 1997; Gaddie 1997; Hinckley 1967; Oppenheimer,
Stimson, and Waterman 1986; Waterman, Oppenheimer, and
Stimson 1991).
Tufte's (1975) groundbreaking work on the role of economic
conditions and presidential popularity set the stage for a spate of
alternative models falling under the heading of referenda theory.
These models envision public assessments of the president's perVOL. 30 2002
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formance as the primary determinant of his party's fate in midterm elections. Following in Tufte's footsteps, many scholars
focus on economic indicators, most commonly change in real
disposable income per capita, as the basis for the referendum
(Alesina and Rosenthal 1989; Arcelus and Meltzer, 1975; Bloom
and Price 1975; Erikson 1988; Hibbs 1987; Lewis-Beck and
Rice 1984, 1992; Rudalevige 2001; Tufte 1975, 1978). As mentioned above, Tufte's (1975) model also included presidential
popularity as an explanatory variable, and several subsequent
works have expanded on this (Kernell 1977; Lau 1982, 1985).
Debate about what drives the phenomenon of midterm losses
remains unresolved. Even within the two more encompassing
categories, disagreement exists over causal mechanisms and key
independent variables. Rather than test the relative merits of the
two broad theoretical perspectives, however, I highlight one of
the intra-approach debates. Specifically, I examine Angus Campbell's (1960, 1964, 1966) "original" theory of surge and decline
and the "revised" version offered by James Campbell (1987,
1993).2 In doing so, my focus is not on explaining and predicting
midterm losses, but rather on individual-level behavior.
SURGE AND DECLINE:
THE ORIGINAL AND REVISED FORMULATIONS

Original Theory
Angus Campbell's original formulation of surge and decline
was an effort to use survey data to provide an individual-level
explanation for the regularities of lower turnout in midterm elections and the loss of congressional seats by the president's party.
2

Unless otherwise noted , this paper will use Campbell to refer to Angus Campbell and J.
Campbell to refer to James Campbell .
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In Campbell's theory, party identification is dominant in determining individuals' behavior. An attachment to one or the other
political party makes it more probable that a citizen will participate in politics and that she will consistently vote for candidates
of the same party label. Political interest is also important. Some
individuals are more engaged in the political arena than others
and are consequently more likely to be regular participants.
Party identification and political interest thus establish a baseline for individual behavior and the phenomenon of surge and
decline represents deviations from this baseline caused by shortterm political stimuli. These stimuli include policy issues, the
candidates involved in a particular contest, and other nonenduring forces. When such stimuli are numerous and powerful,
the election can be described as a "high-stimulus" election, while
elections in which short-term forces are weaker are considered
"low-stimulus." High-stimulus elections generally have higher
levels of turnout as individuals whose levels of political interest
and party attachment might not be sufficient to induce participation in low-stimulus contests are drawn into action. These citizens, who only vote when short-term forces are strong, are the
"peripheral" voters who constitute the first component of electoral surges.
Some "core" voters also contribute to electoral surges. Because they have stronger party ties and more interest in politics,
these individuals participate in all elections and tend to be loyal
to their chosen party. Nevertheless, they too are subject to the
influence of short-term forces. For some core voters these forces
can be potent enough to overcome their underlying dispositions,
leading to "defection" from their preferred party in a given election.
It is not sufficient, however, to argue that some elections will
induce greater participation and defection due to the strength of
their associated short-term stimuli. To account for the regularities
VOL. 30 2002
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observed, surge and decline theory must make two additional
claims. First, Campbell proposes that presidential elections involve, by nature, significantly higher levels of stimulus than their
midterm counterparts. Second, the short-term forces present in
presidential years will generally favor one party over the other.
As a result, both the partisan division of the peripheral voters
participating and the balance of defections by core voters will
favor that party. The party benefiting is almost invariably that
with the winning presidential candidate, and that party is therefore likely to gain seats in Congress.
Having outlined the logic of partisan surges in presidential
years, the decline in midterm elections is quite straightforward.
The diminished level of stimulation in these years means that
peripheral voters who had participated in the preceding presidential contest will now choose to stay home while core voters will
revert to their underlying preferences. With both elements of the
surge removed, the presidential party will suffer losses and the
result should approximate a longer-term equilibrium or "normal
vote" in which each party receives a proportion of the vote commensurate with the proportion of citizens who identify more
strongly with that party.
Campbell's (1966) analysis of electoral decline relies on data
from a 1956-58 panel study by the Survey Research Center. The
majority of his findings are supportive of the theory. The shortterm stimuli associated with the presidential campaign of 1956
did seem to stimulate turnout relatively more for Independents
than for strong partisans (as shown by the relative shares of these
two groups respectively in the voting public in 1956 and 1958).
In addition, the influence of short-term forces on the vote choice
of peripheral citizens was borne out by the two-to-one margin
enjoyed by Eisenhower among such voters in 1956. These shortterm forces also appeared to be more powerful for peripheral
voters than core voters, as evidenced by lower defection rates
THE J OU RNAL OF PO LITI CAL SCIE N CE
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among the latter group. Furthermore, defection rates in the presidential contest were quite unequal, with Democrats abandoning
their candidate far more often than Republicans. Finally, the ability of short-term forces to alter behavior of core voters was seen
in the dramatic decline in Democratic defection rates between
1956 and 1958.
Although Campbell's theory went essentially unchallenged
for nearly a decade, it did eventually come under closer scrutiny
by other scholars. In addition to the emergence of referenda
models, the propositions of surge and decline themselves were
increasingly brought into question. The first notable studies
showed not only that the sociodemographic composition of midterm and presidential electorates is almost identical, but that
these electorates also lack meaningful differences in terms of
their partisanship (Arseneau and Wolfinger 1973; Wolfinger,
Rosenstone, and McIntosh 1981; Kernell 1977). There is also
evidence that defection rates are not necessarily higher in presidential years than in midterm elections (Ornstein et al. 1984).
Furthermore, core voters may not be more loyal to their identified party than are peripheral individuals (Cover 1985; Kernell
1977). The lack of greater fidelity by core voters is also implied
by aggregate data that show midterm elections to be more volatile than their presidential counterparts (Jacobson and Kernell
1983).
Revised Theory
In response to these findings challenging many of the hypotheses proposed by surge and decline, James Campbell (1987,
1993) formulated a revised version of the theory. Like the original version, J. Campbell's theory presumes that higher levels of
short-term political stimuli associated with presidential elections
drive the surge and decline phenomenon. Short-term forces favor
the party winning the presidency, resulting in congressional gains
VOL . 30 2002
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for that party. The subsequent midterm election then brings about
a return to normal turnout and vote choice patterns and losses for
the party controlling the presidency.
The primary difference between the original and revised theories is in the individual-level processes hypothesized to be at
work. 3 J. Campbell proposes that the electoral cycle is a product
of variations in the vote choice of Independents and the turnout
of partisans. Presuming that strength of partisan identification is
positively related to turnout in all elections, J. Campbell claims
that Independents will not experience disproportionate (relative
to partisans) increases in turnout under the high stimulus conditions of presidential campaigns. Instead, the contribution of this
group to surge and decline is the result of their greater support
for candidates of the winning presidential party in on-year elections than off-year elections.
The proposed effect of short-term stimuli on partisans is also
different. Rather than contributing to the surge by causing some
proportion of identifiers of the losing presidential candidate's
party to defect, these stimuli are believed to exert influence via
turnout effects. Pointing to literature on the effects of crosspressures (e.g. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Zipp
1985; Southwell 1986), J. Campbell argues that "disadvantaged"
partisans (i.e. individuals identifying with the party of the losing
presidential candidate) are more likely to abstain than defect. In
addition to the withdrawal of disadvantaged partisans, the biased
short-term stimuli of presidential years create a sense of enthusiasm among "advantaged" partisans, thereby augmenting their
participation. Without powerful stimuli favoring one party over
3

lt should also be noted that J. Campbell's (I 987, 1993) revised theory also entails an
attempt to merge surge and decline with referenda approaches by including presidential
popularity and economic conditions in his model for midterm election outcomes . More
recently (1997), J. Campbell has also incorporated realignment into his model of midterm
decline .
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the other, midterm contests lack the strong cross-pressures and
reinforcing pressures of on-years. Consequently, partisan turnout
levels more closely approximate the proportion of identifiers in
the electorate and the presidential party suffers some setbacks.
In his 1987 piece, J. Campbell examines two testable hypotheses that follow from his theory using data from National
Election Studies covering the seven election pairs from 1956 to
1982.• He finds that partisan representation in the presidential
electorate varies directly with the strength of short-term stimuli
favoring their party (as measured by the actual partisan division
of the presidential vote) and that the presidential vote division of
Independents also reflects the strength and direction of shortterm forces.
In J. Campbell's most complete formulation (1993), he identifies three types of propositions emerging from the original and
revised theories of surge and decline: national, district, and electorate. The propositions of the two theories are identical across
the first two categories, and the findings are generally supportive
of the notion that short-term political stimuli are an important
determinant of congressional candidates' electoral fortunes. It is
with regard to the electorate that the two theories diverge. J.
Campbell lists six propositions derived from the original theory,
two of which diverge from the expectations of his own model.
He states those two as follows:i
'The actual wording of the hypotheses (p. 970) is as follows :
(I) Partisans should be present in the presidential electorate in direct proportion to the
magnitude of short-term forces favorable to their party.
(2) The division of the independent vote in presidential elections should reflect the
magnitude of short-term forces favoring one party over the other.
lThe four additional hypotheses are as follows :
Proposition 5: All things being equal, midterm electorates are older than presidential
electorates (p . 45).
Proposition 6: All things being equal, midterm electorates are morehighly educated
than presidential electorates (p. 45) .
Note continues on next page .
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Proposition 8: All things being equal, voters with a
strong party identification compose a larger segment
of midterm electorates than of presidential electorates
(p. 46).
Proposition 9: Partisan defections from the disadvantaged party (i.e., the party losing the presidential
race) in presidential elections are greater than in midterm elections and are proportionate to the short-term
forces favoring the president's party (p. 48).

Using a variety of data covering the years 1952-1990, J.
Campbell finds that neither of these propositions is well supported . Instead, the evidence seems to favor the revised theory 's
expectations regarding turnout and vote choice.
SURGE AND DECLINE: TESTABLE HYPOTHESES

J. Campbell's most recent analysis (1997) of midterm decline
examines possible additions to his model to help account for the
overwhelming losses by Democrats in 1994. Incorporating realignment into the explanation is a significant step. However, the
work does not address the electorate propositions that differentiate the original and revised surge and decline theories. Perhaps J.
Campbell views the matter as settled. I revisit the debate for two
reasons. First, there is a need to outline an explicit list of testable
propositions derived from each theory. Second, J. Campbell's
Proposition 7: All things being equal, voters with a deep and sustained interest in politics compose a larger segment of midterm electorates than of presidential electorates (p.46) .
Propo sition 10: The independent vote for the president's party in presidential elections
is greater than in midterm elections and is proportionate to the short-term forces fa.
voring the president 's party .(p .48) .
J. Campbell argues, and I agree, that propositions 5 and 6 are essentially tangential to the
validity of the theory. While more central to the original theory, propositions 7 and 10 do
not conflict with expectations of the revised model.
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examination (1993) of the competing theories uses different
types of data than those employed by his predecessor. This study
addresses both issues in an attempt to more directly compare the
two theories. I begin by presenting testable hypotheses (which
can be grouped into those dealing with turnout and those dealing
with vote choice) for each of the models.
Turnout
As noted above, the original and revised theories differ in
their beliefs about the effect of short-term stimuli on the participation rates of partisan groups. According to the original theory,
the lack of partisan attachments among Independents makes
them less likely to participate, ceteris paribus, and consequently
relatively more stimulated by presidential elections than their
party identifier counterparts. This leads to:
Hypothesis 1 (Hl): The presidential-year electorate
will have a higher percentage of Independents (or, at
least, individuals who are not strong partisans) than
that of the midterm.

The hypothesis may also be stated in terms of partisan composition of core and peripheral voters:
Hypothesis IA (HlA): Independents (or, at least, individuals who are not strong partisans) represent a
larger share of peripheral voters than they do of core
voters.

Meanwhile, the revised theory presumes that Independents
and partisans are approximately equal in their underlying propensities to participate in elections and that short-term political
stimuli affect turnout by creating cross-pressures for disadvantaged partisans. Consequently, we have:

VOL. 30 2002
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): The proportion of Independents
in presidential-year and midterm electorates will be
approximately equal.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Advantaged partisans will compose a larger segment of presidential-year than midterm electorates .
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Disadvantaged partisans will
compose a smaller segment of presidential-year than
midterm electorates.

Again, these hypotheses may be rephrased in terms of core
and peripheral voters:
Hypothesis 2A (H2A): The proportion of Independents in the ranks of core and peripheral voters will be
approximately equal.
Hypothesis 3A (H3A): Advantaged partisans will
compose a larger segment of peripheral voters than
core voters.
Hypothesis 4A (H4A): Disadvantaged partisans will
compose a smaller segment of peripheral voters than
core voters.

As should be apparent, hypotheses 1 and 2 (IA and 2A) are
directly contradictory. This is shown in Table 1 by their juxtaposition and also means that the two may be framed as null and
alternative hypotheses for a single statistical test (see Appendix
B). In contrast, hypotheses 3 and 4 have no counterparts in the
original theory.
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TABLE 1
Hypotheses of the Original and Revised Theories
of Surge and Dec1ine
ORIGINAL THEORY

REVISED THEORY

Turnout
H 1I 1A: Independents

greater
share of: on v. off-year electorates/peripheral v. core voters

Independents equal
share of: on and off-year electorates /peripheral
and core
voters
H3/3A: Advantaged partisans
greater share of: on v. off-year
electorates /peripheral v. core
voters
H4 /4A: Disadvantaged partisans smaller share of: on v. offyear electorates /peripheral v.
core voters
H2 /2A :

Vote Choice
H5: Defection rates lower for

H8: Defection rates equal for
core v. eri heral voters
core and eri heral voters
H6: Defection rates in on-years H9: Defection rates equal for
higher for disadvantaged v. advantaged and disadvantaged
advanta ed artisans
artisans
H7: Defection rates higher in H 10: Defection rates equal in
on v. off- ears
on and off- ears
H 11: Higher independent vote for presidential party in on v. offyears
H12: Higher vote for presidential party by peripheral v. core voters

VOL. 30 2002
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Vote Choice
The two theories also differ in their expectations regarding
the behavior of individuals in the voting booth. The original theory regards the participation of partisans as a given and posits
that short-term stimuli can alter the decisions of these citizens.
Variability in the strength of short-term stimuli, the predictable
directional bias of these stimuli in presidential years, and variation in the susceptibility of individuals to these stimuli lead to
the following propositions:
Hypothesis 5 (HS): Core voters will exhibit lower defection rates than peripheral voters.
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Defection rates will be higher for
disadvantaged partisans than for advantaged partisans
in presidential years.
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Rates of defection will be higher
in presidential years than in midterms.

In contrast, the revised theory presumes that the primary effect of short-term stimuli on party identifiers is on their likelihood to cast a ballot, not whom they mark on the ballot if they
do show up to the polls. This implies:
Hypothesis 8 (H8): Defection rates of core and peripheral voters will be approximately equal.
Hypothesis 9 (H9): Defection rates of advantaged and
disadvantaged partisans will be approximately equal
in both presidential years and midterms.
Hypothesis 10 (RIO): Defection rates will be approximately equal in presidential years and midterms.

As with hypotheses 1 and 2, these hypotheses derived from
each of the theories are diametrically opposed. As before, this is
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL
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illustrated by their side-by-side placement (5 and 8, 6 and 9, and
7 and 10 respectively) in Table 1.
Before continuing, I note two hypotheses regarding vote
choice shared by the original and revised models:
Hypothesis 11 (HI I) : The percentage of Independents voting for candidates of the president's party
will be higher in presidential-years than in midterms.
Hypothesis 12 (H12): The percentage of peripheral
voters voting for candidates of the president's party
will exceed that of core voters.

The logic behind hypothesis 11 is straightforward: the shortterm stimuli that are important to the choices made by Independents are biased in favor of the winning presidential candidate's
party. In contrast, the two theories arrive at hypothesis 12 from
different directions. The original theory presumes that peripheral
voters support the winning party largely due to the disproportionate representation of Independents and weak partisans in that
group. The revised theory views disproportionate support of peripheral individuals as resulting from the effects of short-term
stimuli on partisan turnout outlined in hypotheses 3A and 4A.
Design
Because theories of surge and decline are grounded in visions
of individual change, the data (aggregate-level) and methods
used in most analyses of midterm losses are of limited utility for
present purposes. Instead, comparing surge and decline models is
best accomplished using data that allow for examination of individual behavior over consecutive elections. Consequently, like
Scheve and Tomz (1999), I use the American National Election
Studies' (NES) panel surveys of 1956-60, 1972-76, and 1992-
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94.6 Methodologically, the analysis is not complicated. Each of
the hypotheses outlined above specifies a personal trait (e.g.
party affiliation) or type of behavior (e.g. defection) that is of
interest. The traits or behaviors under examination can each be
regarded as dichotomous variables. Two examples illustrate the
point. In testing hypotheses I and 2, each observation (namely
individuals casting a vote) falls into either the category of Independent or non-Independent (i.e. partisan). Similarly, hypotheses
5-10 require only a distinction between individuals who defect
and those who do not.
The dichotomous nature of our variables of interest allows us
to regard each individual observation as an instance of either
"success" or "failure." Consequently, each observation represents a Bernoulli trial with some underlying probability of success.1 Of course, we are not comparing the outcomes of
individual cases in testing our hypotheses. Rather, we are interested in the number, or, more precisely, the proportion, of successes across repeated Bernoulli trials. For example, in
hypotheses I and 2, we wish to compare the proportion of Independents (instances of success) in the presidential and midterm
electorates. As with all statistical hypothesis tests, however, we
wish to test the population parameters, not the proportions observed in our samples. Using our sample information, the appropriate statistical test is the z-test for comparison of two
proportions derived from independent groups and the test statistic is
z = (Pl-P2)-(JZ"l-1Z"2)/ ,JP1(1-Pl)/ nl + P2(1-P2/ n2)
6The surveys are conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of M ichigan, and the data is organized and made available by the Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research . Neither of these organizations bears any responsibility for
the analysis and conclusions found here .
7
11is also assumed that the observations are statistically independent, i.e. that the success
or failure on any given trial does not affect the probability of success for any other trial.
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where P 1 is the sample proportion for the first group, P2 is the
sample proportion for the second group, 1tl is the population
proportion for the first group, 1t2 is the population proportion for
the second group, and n 1 and n2 are the sample sizes of the first
and second groups respectively 1
In looking at the test statistic, we note its sensitivity to both
sample sizes and the distance of the sample proportions from 0.5.
Differences of the same magnitude between proportions will be
more likely to be statistically significant as sample sizes are increased and/or as proportions approach the extremes of O and 1.
Given this sensitivity, the present analysis emphasizes not only
statistical significance, but also the directional consistency of
findings.
In addition to methodological procedures, two substantive aspects of this analysis deserve more detailed mention here. First is
the issue of classifying individuals as core, peripheral, or nonvoters. Previous work has adopted one of two approaches in this
regard. Some research, especially that not employing panel data,
has used respondents' answers to the question regarding participation in previous presidential elections (e.g. Cove.r 1985). If
individuals claim that they have voted in all or almost all
("most") elections since they were old enough to do so they are
regarded as core voters. Peripheral voters are individuals who
claim to have voted in only some of the elections while nonvoters are those who say they have never participated. The alternative method involves using behavior in successive elections as
the defining criterion. Thus, individuals who respond that they
have participated in both elections are classified as core voters.
Given the lack of retrospective voting questions in most surveys,
this method is more appropriate for panel studies and is the definition most commonly employed by Campbell (1966). This pa8

Appendix B contains a more complete discussion of the exact tests performed .
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per adopts the second technique, using responses to the following survey item: "In talking to people about the elections, we
often find that a lot of people weren't able to vote because they
weren't registered or they were sick or they just didn't have time.
How about you, did you vote in the elections this fa11?"9 Individuals answering "yes" in both years of the relevant panel qualify as core voters, those affirming participation in only the
presidential year are considered peripheral voters, while those
answering "no" both times are nonvoters.' 0
The second issue deserving more careful explanation is the
treatment of party identification. At question is the proper measure of party identification. In his 1966 piece, Campbell employs
a five-point scale that distinguishes between strong and weak
partisans while grouping together "leaners" and "pure" Independents." As subsequent research has illustrated, however, not
9

This wording is taken from the 1972 post-election survey. Some wording discrepancies
between the years included in this study do exist, but there is no reason to suspect that
these variations might lead to systematic differences in citizens' responses . Wording for
the relevant item in other years, as well as descriptions of other variables, can be found in
Appendix A.
11
'This is obviously not the only possible classification scheme . For instance, peripheral
voters might alternatively be conceived of as individuals who participated in one of the
two election years, regardless of which . The approach used here is chosen in order to
more clearly outline differences between habitual voters and citizens who are only motivated to participate under high stimulus conditions .
11
The distinction between these types of Independents comes from responses to the follow-up question in the party identification sequence of queries . For the order and text of
these questions see Appendix A. Debate about the proper measure of party identification
remains unresolved. Miller (1991 ), one of the founders of the Michigan school, has argued that there is a distinction to be made between party identification and partisanship .
He maintains that the original intent of the party identification variable was only the longterm affective attachment to a political party and that the appropriate measure is consequently a three-point scale based on responses to the root question (again, see Appendix
A for question text). In contrast, partisanship includes not only direction of party commitment, but also its strength . While it is not my intention to take any position in this
debate at the present time, most of the analysis here employs the three-point party identification measure.
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all Independents are equal. Instead, those Independents who reveal that they lean toward one of the two parties exhibit behavior
that is often more partisan than that of weak identifiers of that
party (Keith et al. 1992). Consequently, use of a five-point scale
may obscure some important differences within the ranks of Independents with regard to their voter status (i.e. core v. peripheral v. non) and their vote choice. In keeping with the initial
examination of surge and decline, findings in the current study
are presented with leaners included among the ranks of Independents. Separate analyses were conducted in which distinctions between types of Independents were made, but these were
generally supportive of those reported here.
The other point to be made about party identification is that it
is not immutable. Literature regarding the endogenous nature of
party identification dates back at least to Fiorina (1981) and it is
now widely accepted that individual movement along the sevenpoint scale over time is not uncommon. Consequently, in
presenting behavioral patterns of partisans, a determination must
be made regarding the appropriate temporal measurement of
their identification. This paper adopts the convention of using
citizens' initial response (i.e. that given in the presidential year).
Findings
The 1992-94 Election Cycle: Turnout. As is always the case
with political surveys, the 1992-94 NES panel yields an inflated
estimate of electoral participation. A full 62% of the respondents
claimed to have voted in both elections while another 20% reported voting only in the 1992 contests. Unfortunately, recent
NES studies have not included a voter validation component.
While we cannot be certain about the nature of overreporting, it
seems unlikely that overreports are systematically biased in a
fashion that would be of concern to the present study. We have
no reason to suspect that either Independents or adherents of one
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or the other political party would be more prone to exaggerate
their behavior.
Of those individuals casting a vote in 1992, 36% classified
themselves as Independents. In the midterm contests two years
later, this percentage remained unchanged. This finding clearly
supports the revised theory's claim that short-term stimuli do not
disproportionately encourage Independents to participate. Given
this, we might expect the revised theory's hypotheses regarding
TABLE 2

Partisan Composition of
Electorates and Voter Types, 1992-1994
in percents (may not add to 100 due to rounding)

Party Identification
Strong Democrat
Weak Democrat
Democrat Leaner
Pure Independent
Republican Leaner
Weak Republican
Strong Republican
Totals

1992

n = 600
16
18
13
8
15
16
14
100

1994
n = 472

Core
n = 451

Peripheral
n = 149

16
17
12
8
15
16
16
100

16
17
12
7
16
16
16
100

17
18
16
13
12
15
9
100

cross pressures to also fare well. Looking at Table 2, however,
we see that the evidence is far from convincing. While Democrats did compose a larger share of the 1992 voters, their percentage in that year exceeded their midterm share by only a single
point. The two-percentage point rise in the Republican share
from 1992 to 1994 still fails to meet conventional standards for
statistical significance.
As J. Campbell notes, differences in the composition of
presidential and midterm electorates should be muted versions of
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the differences that will exist in comparing core and peripheral
voters. Consequently, an examination of the alternative hypotheses regarding turnout may yield information that helps pass
judgment on the relative merit of the competing theories. Returning to the original theory's proposition that Independents should
be more motivated by short-term forces and should therefore be
better represented among peripheral voters than core voters, we
are indeed confronted with more noticeable variations. As shown
in Table 2, Independents compose a full 41 % of peripheral citizens versus 35% of the core. While more eye-catching, this difference still does not attain statistical significance. However,
looking at Table 2, we see that the 6% gap is driven entirely by
pure Independents, and, for that group, a gap of this magnitude is
significant. 12
Turning to the revised theory's hypotheses about the relative
presence of advantaged and disadvantaged partisans we again
find mixed evidence. As expected, each category of Democrat
identifiers is more represented among the peripheral voters while
the Republicans all compose a larger share of core voters. Yet,
the only difference that is statistically significant across the two
types of voters is that of strong Republicans. 13 J. Campbell's hypothesis regarding cross-pressures for disadvantaged partisans is
borne out for this group. While it makes sense that more committed identifiers might be the most likely to experience discordance
and withdraw from participation, a discussion of variation in
cross-pressure effects is missing in J. Campbell's exposition. For
strong partisans, the decision to cross party lines is probably
more momentous than for their weaker counterparts. Further12
This is an illustrative example of how statistical significance in the z-test for comparing
proportions is a function of sample size and distance of the proportions from 0.5.
13
The fact that the only significant difference is for Republicans suggests there may be an
asymmetric effect of the biased political stimuli on the turnout decisions of advantaged
and disadvantaged partisans .
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more, Perot's candidacy may have exacerbated this differential
effect by presenting a fourth (in addition to voting for either one
of the major party candidates or abstaining) alternative that was
more appealing to weaker Republicans.
The 1992-94 Election Cycle: Vote Choice.A look at behavior
in voting booths may provide some additional insight into questions about intra- and inter-party variations and the role of a viable third-party candidate. The first question to be answered
concerns the relative loyalty of core and peripheral partisans to
their party's candidate. The original theory posits that the weaker
partisan binds among peripheral voters should lead them to defect at higher rates (HS) while the revised version envisions little
difference since the decision for most partisans is whether or not
to vote at all, not for whom to vote. In Table 3, we see that the
differences are in the direction predicted by HS." We notice once
again, however, that Perot's presence complicates the analysis.
When we consider only cases of "pure" defection (i.e. Democrats voting for Bush and Republicans for Clinton), the peripheral
rate exceeds that of the core voters by only 3 percentage points.
But, if we include votes cast for Perot as defection, the difference
jumps to a statistically significant 10 points. Peripheral partisans
were more likely to vote for Perot than were their core counterparts (see Table 4).
A glance at defection in the 1992 congressional races
strengthens the case for HS. The magnitude of the coreperipheral gap in those contests is 9 percentage points. It appears
that the same forces leading individuals to vote against their
party's presidential nominee were at work to steer them away
from congressional candidates with the same label. While not
"Note that Table 3 excludes !caners from the partisan ranks in calculating defection rates .
If !caners are treated as identifiers, the differences between core and peripheral voters
become more pronounced .
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exactly the prototypical coattails effect, this pattern does point to
a meaningful relationship between choices made at the top of the
ticket and those for lower offices .
TABLE3

Defection Rates of Various Voter Groups
in Presidential and Congressional Elections, 1992-1994
(in percents)

Presidential Election
All Voters
Core Voters
Peripheral Voters
Democrats
Strong
Weak
Republicans
Strong
Weak

Congressional Elections
All Voters
Core Voters
Peripheral Voters
Democrats
Strong
Weak
Republicans
Strong
Weak

1992*

1992j

n = 328
10
9
12
10
3
16
10
3
15
n = 314
22
20
29
16
12
19
28
21
36

n= 374
22
20
30
17
5
28
27
15
37

1994

n=279
17
17
18
16
19
15
9
22

*Defection rates for the presidential contest in this column represent "pure" defection (Democrats voting for Bush and Republicans voting for Clinton).
fDefection rates for the presidential contest in this column include votes for Perot
by identifiers of either party as instances of defection .
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with cross-pressures, the decision was made to show up to the
poll and abandon their party's candidate. Meanwhile, the Democratic defection increase points to the operation of coattails
(even if not of overwhelming magnitude) in 1992.
In addition to the competing propositions examined above,
the two theories hold two common expectations. First, they both
propose that the contextual bias favoring the winning presidential candidate's party will influence the vote choice of Independents, leading them to provide more support for that party in the
presidential-year election than the following midterm (HI 1). The
evidence here is clear. Whether we consider all Independents or
just the pure variety, Table 4 reveals there is a significant decrease in the percentage of the vote given to Democratic congressional candidates from 1992 to 1994. The second hypothesis
common to the two theories (although, as discussed above, on
the basis of differing rationales) is that peripheral voters will be
more supportive of the president's party than will core voters
(H 12). Once again, the conclusion reached depends at least
partly on how we treat votes for Perot. 45% of both core and peripheral voters chose Clinton, but this figure represents 59% of
the two-party vote of peripheral individuals and only 53% for
core citizens. The 5-percentage point gap in the expected direction between votes for Democratic House candidates by the two
types of voters lends additional credence to the proposition.
Evidence From Earlier Studies : Turnout

Both the presence of a strong third-party candidate and the
sensitivity of the z-test for comparing proportions to sample
sizes and the distance of the proportions from 0.5 makes the task
of passing definitive judgment on the relative merit of the original and revised theories more daunting. One way in which we
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Having revealed differences in defection rates across types of
voters, we turn our attention to partisan differences. Here, the
original theory holds that the biased nature of short-term stimuli
in presidential years leads to greater defection by disadvantaged
partisans (H6) while J. Campbell again argues that the effects of
the stimuli are manifest in turnout rates rather than vote choice
(H9). As with the core v. peripheral distinction, the definition of
defection employed has a bearing on the appropriate conclusion.
Democrats and Republicans each leant 10% support to the presidential candidate of the other party, but when votes for Perot are
included, the Republicans defected at a 27% clip compared to
the 17% mark for Democrats. Again, behavior in the congressional elections lends greater credence to the original theory with
the gap between advantaged and disadvantaged partisans being
12 percentage points.
The final point on which the two theories differ with regard to
vote choice is their propositions about defection rates across successive elections. The original theory suggests that the relatively
low levels of stimuli at midterms will lead to diminished instances of defection (H7) while the revised version once again
posits that the tendency for disadvantaged partisans to abstain in
presidential years leads to stable defection rates across elections
(Hl 0). Comparison of defection rates across years requires the
use of congressional elections, and in Table 3 we see that the rate
for all participants in the respective years did drop by 5 percentage points. Even if we restrict the comparison to individuals who
participated in both years (since we already know that peripheral
voters are likely to defect more than core voters), there is a 3point decline. Most telling, however, are the rates for identifiers
of the two parties. The Republicans had their rate cut almost in
half while the Democrats actually edged up a couple percentage
points. The former indicates that for many Republicans faced
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can gain additional confidence in our conclusions is by examining the competing hypotheses across a number of data sets. Unfortunately, panel studies are quite expensive, and the NES series
consequently includes only two additional panel surveys since its
inception, one covering the years 1956-60 and the other spanning
1972-76. 15 In looking at the data from these studies, we are espeTABLE4

Electoral Support for Candidates of the Party Winning the
Presidency by Various Voter Groups, 1992-1994
(in percents)

Presidential Election
All Voters
Core Voters
Peripheral Voters
Independents
Pure
Democrat Leaners
Republican Leaners

Congressional Elections
All Voters
Core Voters
Peripheral Voters
Independents
Pure
Democrat Leaners
Republican Leaners

1992*
n = 589
45
45
45

40
39
73
11
n =486
56
55

1992t
n = 488
55
53
59
54

1994

60
95
15
n = 413

47
47

60
53
51
75
35

42
43
68
22

•Figures for the presidential contest in this column represent absolute vote percentages for Clinton .
tFigures for the presidential contest in this column represent Clinton's share of the
two-party vote.
15

While each of these panel surveys covers three elections, two presidential years and one
midterm , the analysis here uses data from only the initial presidential-year contest and the
subsequent midterm (i.e. 1956 and 1958, and 1972 and 1974).
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cially concerned with the consistency of behavioral patterns
across election cycles of different decades. Even if not always
statistically significant, repeated findings supportive of one theory over the other should be regarded as meaningful evidence
upon which to draw conclusions.
As was the case with the 1992-94 cycle, evidence from the
earlier periods regarding turnout propositions generally favors
the original theory. As shown in Table 5, Independents did comTABLE 5
Partisan Composition of Electorates
in percents (may not add to 100 due to rounding)

Party
Identification
Strong Democrat
Weak Democrat
Democrat Leaner
Pure Independent
Republican Leaner
Weak Republican
Strong Republican
Totals

1956
(n=834)
22
21
7
9
9
16
16
I 00

1958
(n=681)
22
21
7
9
8
15
18
100

1972
(n=1216)
15
25
11
9
12
15
14
100

1974
(n=916)
16
23
10
8
12
15
15
100

pose a larger share of the presidential-year electorate than the
midterm in both the 1950s and 1970s panels. While these differences (1 percentage point in each case) fail to attain statistical
significance, they are in the predicted direction. In contrast, the
revised theory's expectations about the relative shares of party
identifiers in subsequent electorates are clearly repudiated. In
both cycles, the proportion of advantaged partisans (Republicans) in the voting public increases as we move from the presidential-year to the midterm. This directly contradicts H3. The
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story for disadvantaged partisans is almost as unfavorable to the
revised theory. fustead of witnessing a rise in their share of the
electorate from the on to the off-year as suggested by H4, disadvantaged partisans retain the same shares in 1958 and 1974 as in
1956 and 1972 respectively.
Comparison of the turnout hypotheses in terms of core and
peripheral distinctions also clearly favors the original theory.
Table 6 reveals that the proportion of fudependents among peripheral voters was significantly larger than that among core votTABLE6

Partisan Composition of Voter Types
in percents (may not add to I 00 due to rounding)

1956-1958
1972-1974
Party
Core
Peripheral
Core
Peripheral
(n = 681)
Identification
(n = 153)
(n = 916) (n = 300)
Strong Democrat
22
20
16
11
Weak Democrat
21
22
23
29
Democrat Leaner
7
7
10
14
Pure Independent
12
9
8
12
Republican Leaner
8
12
12
12
Weak Republican
15
20
15
13
Strong Republican
18
9
15
10
Totals
100
100
100
100
*Columns maynot add to 100 due to rounding.

ers in both of the earlier election cycles. fu addition to failing
with respect to H2A, the revised theory runs into trouble with
both H3A and H4A. The differences across voter classifications
for advantaged partisans are in the opposite direction of those
predicted by J. Campbell. fu both the 1956-58 and 1972-74 panels, Republicans represent a larger share of core voters than pe-
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ripheral voters. 16 On the Democratic or disadvantaged partisan
side of the ledger, the most notable finding is the relative lack of
differences across core and peripheral percentages. In the earlier
panel, Democrats maintain a two-percentage point edge among
core voters, but in the later panel they represent a larger share of
peripheral voters by a single percentage point. The revised theory's proposition that cross-pressures should induce abstention
by disadvantaged partisans is not supported.
Evidence From Earlier Studies: Vote Choice
As with the turnout hypotheses, the evidence from the panel
surveys of the 1950s and 1970s generally tends to favor the vote
choice propositions of the original theory over those of the revised version. In both 1956 and 1972, peripheral individuals
were more likely to cast a vote for the presidential candidate of
the opposition party than were their core counterparts as seen in
Table 7. Unlike the 1992-94 cycle, however, defection rates in
congressional contests do not reinforce the support for HS over
H8. Here, we note that in both 1956 and 1972, core voters actually abandoned candidates of their own party at a higher clip
than peripheral voters by a single percentage point. The discrepancy between evidence at the presidential and congressional levels indicates a less than perfect relationship between choices
made at each level.
Disjunction between presidential and congressional voting
patterns is further illustrated in examining propositions about
potential variations between the defection rates of advantaged
and disadvantaged partisans. In the presidential contests of both
1956 and 1972, the defection rate of Republicans paled in comparison to that of Democrats (4% to 25% in 1956 and 5% to 44%
16
lf leaners are treated as partisans, the Republicans do compose a single percentage point
higher proportion of peripheral voters than core voters in the 1956-58 cycle .
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TABLE 7

Defection Rates of Various Voter Groups
in Presidential and Congressional Elections
(in percents)

1956
Presidential Election
All Voters
Core Voters
Peripheral Voters
Democrats
Strong
Weak
Republicans
Strong
Weak
Congressional Elections
All Voters
Core Voters
Peripheral Voters
Democrats
Strong
Weak
Republicans
Strong
Weak

1958

n = 619

16
15
21
25

1974

27
26
30
44
28
53
5
2
7

13

37
4
0
8
n = 577
9

1972
n = 797

n = 493

11
8

14
14

11

9

5
16
6
4
8

4
15
20
7
37

n = 681

18
18
17
15
8
20
21
18
24

n = 574

18
18
13
5
18
24
20
28

in 1972), a finding in line with the original theory 's H6. Again , it
seems that the bias of short-term stimuli does induce defection
rather than abstention. While Democrats also defected more than
Republ icans in the congressional elections of 1956, the difference was far less noteworthy at three percentage points . And , in
1972, Republicans actually voted for Democratic congressional
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candidates at a higher rate than Democrats voted for Republicans, a difference in the opposite direction of that hypothesized
by the original theory (although not supportive of the revised
version's expectation of no differences either).
Variations between choices made at the presidential and congressional levels indicate that short-term stimuli that favor one of
the presidential candidates do not necessarily provide much
guidance for down-ballot contests. In other words, the effects of
presidential coattails have some real limitations. Nevertheless, it
would be misleading to completely disregard the role of national
forces in congressional elections. A simple comparison of defection rates of identifiers of both parties across consecutive congressional races illustrates the point. The presence of coattails is
indicated by higher defection rates for disadvantaged partisans in
the presidential-year than the subsequent midterm and lower
rates for advantaged partisans in the initial election. With the
exception of greater Republican defection in 1974 than 1972 (an
occurrence which may be linked to the surfacing of the Watergate scandal), this pattern does indeed hold.
Variation in defection rates across subsequent elections is also
the topic of the final pair of competing hypotheses regarding
vote choice. As with the 1992-94 data, we examine H7 and HlO
by comparing defection rates for both all participants and just
core voters in successive congressional contests. Unlike the most
recent panel, however, the evidence from the earlier periods does
not support the original theory. Defection rates in 1958 actually
exceeded those of 1956 while rates in 1972 and 1974 were essentially stable.
Finally, we tum to the two hypotheses shared by the two
theories. Table 8 shows that as with the 1992-94 cycle, the earlier
two panels support the proposition that the independent vote will
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more markedly lean toward the president 's party in presidential
elections than in midterms (Hl I) . The levels of independent
(both excluding and including partisan leaners) support for Republican congressional candidates in 1958 and 1974 were lower
than in 1956 and 1972 respectively . Once again, it appears that
the presumed partisan bias in presidential-year political stimuli
does exist and that it exerts considerable influence on the vote
choice of those individuals with weak or nonexistent commitments to a political party.
Evidence for H12 is mixed . In 1956, support for both Eisenhower and Republican congressional candidates was higher
among peripheral voters than core voters. However , in 1972 this
pattern was reversed. Contrary to the expectations of both theories, peripheral support for the winning party actually lagged
TABLE 8

Electoral Support for Candidates of the Party Winning
the Presidency by Various Voter Groups

1956
Presidential Election
All Voters
Core Voters
Peripheral Voters
Independents
Pure
Democrat Leaners
Republican Leaners
Congressional Elections
All Voters
Core Voters
Peripheral Voters
Ind ependents
Pure
Democrat Leaners
Reeublican Leaners

1958

1972

n = 830

n = 1168

60
59
65
73
87
27
95

65
67
61
64
69
36
86

1974

n = 772

n = 649

n = 991

n = 810

49
49
51
57
59
19
85

42
42

45
45
43
46
42
21

40
40

49
54
17
71

72

42
30
22
68
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behind that of core individuals. This result can be traced to the
large presence of Democrats among the ranks of the peripherals.
This presence certainly runs against the revised theory's notion
of cross-pressure leading to abstention. At the same time, the
original theory's supposition that peripheral voters will be easily
moved to vote for the winning party appears overstated. Democrats whom turned out in 1972 but not 1974 were actually quite
loyal to the party.
DISCUSSION

Perhaps more than anything else, the capture of both bodies
of Congress by the Republicans in 1994 inspired the examination
conducted here. The defeat of a number of congressional candidates of the sitting president's party in the midterm elections
once again proved to be of great political relevance. Of course,
the 1994 midterm decline is just another instance of a wellestablished political phenomenon. Yet, despite the fact that this
phenomenon has been in place since the earliest days of modem
American political science, explanations of its regularity remain
incomplete. This paper returns to the original individual-level
model proposed to account for midterm losses and evaluates it
alongside a more recent revision of the model. Table 9 summarizes the findings.
In general, the findings of this study are more favorable to the
surge and decline theory as formulated by Angus Campbell . This
is especially true with regard to the competing versions' predictions about voter turnout. The heightened levels of political
stimuli associated with presidential contests do appear to disproportionately encourage Independents rather than partisans to
vote. Furthermore , the revised theory's claim that cross-pressures
on identifiers of the party losing the presidency should depress
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TABLE 9

Evidence and Conclusions for
Original and Revised Theories' Hypotheses
Hypothesis
(theory)

Subject

Evidence and Conclusion
Turnout

HI (original)

v.
H2 (revised)
HI A (original)
V.

H2A (revised)

Independent share of
electorates
Independent presence
across voter types

H3/H3A (revised)

Turnout of advantaged
partisans

H4/H4A (revised)

Turnout of disadvantaged partisans

HI correctly predicts direction of differences in all cycles, but most differences
statistically
insignificant.
verdict: original theory
HI A supported by all 3 panels. verdict: original theory
marginal support in 1992-94 , not supported in earlier cycles. verdict: not
supported
support in 1992-94, but not earlier
cycles. verdict : not supported

Vote Choice
H5 (original)
V.

H8 (revised)
H6 ( original)
V.

H9 (revised)
H7 (original)
V.

HI O (revised)

Defection rates of core
and peripheral voters
Defection rates of
advantaged and disad vantaged partisans
Defection rates in
presidential and midterm elections

HI 1 (both
theories)

Independent vote
choice in on and offears

Hl2 (both
theories)

Vote choice ofperiphera I and core voters

H5 supported in 1992 and in presidential contests of 1956 and 1972, but not
congressional elections of earlier
years. verdict: leaning original
H6 supported in 1992 and 1956, evidence mixed in 1972.verdict: original
theory
H7 supported in · 1992-94 cycle , HI 0
supported in 1972-74, neither supported m 1956-58.verdict: neither
theory supported
evidence supportive in all 3 panels .
verdict: hypothesis supported
generally supported in 1992, supported
in 1956, not supported in 1972.verdict:
uncertain
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their relative turnout in those years receives little empirical
validation. Partisan biases in political stimuli also do little to
spur greater participation by adherents of the advantaged party.
While the original theory also fares better with regard to
propositions about defection rates, the story here is significantly
more complex. The evidence is most clear on differences between advantaged and disadvantaged partisans. Given the failure
of the revised theory's hypothesis about the role of crosspressures in reducing turnout for disadvantaged partisans , it is
relatively unsurprising that these citizens do defect more than
their advantaged counterparts.
What is perhaps more surprising is the existence of mixed
evidence regarding the question of core and peripheral defection
rates. While peripheral voters do consistently abandon their
party's presidential candidate more than core voters (as predicted
by the original theory), there is no obvious pattern in congressional contests. This finding points to leakages in the relationship
between choices made at the top of the ticket and those made
further down the ballot. Short-term stimuli have a pronounced
and predictable influence on choices made at the presidential
level, but their translation into voting in congressional elections
is less clear.
The uncertain effect of the heightened stimuli surrounding
presidential campaigns on congressional voting is further illustrated by evidence concerning defection rates across successive
elections. The original theory's supposition that a return to the
"normal vote" in midterm elections will mean lower defection
rates in those years does not meet with success. Neither, however, is the revised theory's proposition that defection rates will
remain stable borne out.
An examination of the individuals participating in the three
panel surveys leads to the conclusion that national level forces
do play an important role in the phenomenon of interest. PresiVO L. 30 2002
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dential contests have the effect of bringing a group of citizens to
the polls that don't participate in other elections and, short-term
forces influence the decisions of these individuals and those who
vote on a regular basis. The combination of these two effects
leads to greater support for congressional candidates of the party
enjoying the advantage in short-term stimuli, support that is not
present in the lower-stimulus atmosphere of the midterm elections. At the same time, one finding that has been repeatedly emphasized here is the gap between choices made at the presidential
level and those made regarding candidates for the legislature.
Although the existence of this gap does not necessarily mean that
the coattail effect cannot completely account for the pattern of
variation in the success of in-party and out-party candidates in
successive congressional elections, it does mean that exclusive
attention to national-level forces is unlikely to provide a robust
model of vote choice in congressional elections. Any attempt to
more accurately and completely explain which citizens are more
likely to be influenced by their decision over presidential candidates wiII have to incorporate other variables, including those
reflecting local context. Of course, development of such a model
is beyond the scope of the present analysis.

APPENDIX A
SOURCE AND DATA DESCRIPTION

As mentioned in the text, the data for this analysis come from three
American National Election Studies (NES) panel surveys, those of
1956-60, 1972-76, and 1992-94. The first two of these have been released by ICPSR as independent studies, the third is found in the 1994
post-election study. The question wording and coding schemes of the
items used from the surveys are as follows:
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Turnout
1956 (1972, 1974): "In talking to people about the election we (often)
find that a lot of people weren't able to vote because they weren' t
registered or they were sick or they just didn't have time. How
about you, did you vote this time?"
1958: "In talking to people about the election we find that a lot of them
weren't able to vote because they weren't registered, they were
sick, or something else came up at the last minute. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in the November election?"
1992, 1994: "In talking to people about elections, we often find that a
lot of people were not able to vote because they weren't registered,
they were sick, or they just didn't have time. How about you, did
you vote in the elections this November?"
Coding: 1 if voted, 0 if did not.

Vote choice, President
1956: President: (if yes to turnout question) "Whom did you vote for
for president?"
1972: President: (if yes to turnout question) "Who did you vote for in
the election for president?"
1992: President: (if yes to turnout question) "Who did you vote for?"
Coding (1992): 1 if voted Democratic, 2 if voted Republican (3 if voted
Perot).

Vote choice, House
1956, 1958: "Did you vote for a candidate for Congress. (if yes) Who
did you vote for? (if r does not know candidate's name) Which
party was that?"
1972: "How about the election for congressman- that is, for the House
of Representatives in Washington? Which party's candidate did you
vote for, for congressman?"
1974: Congress: How about the vote for congressman. Did you vote for
a candidate for Congress? (if yes) Who did you vote for? (if r
doesn't know candidate's name) Which party was that?"
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1992, 1994: "Here is a list of candidates for the major races in this district. How about the election for the House of Representatives in
Washington, did you vote for a candidate for the U.S . House of
Representatives? (if yes) Who did you vote for?"
Coding: 1 if voted Democratic, 2 if voted Republican .

Party Identification/Partisanship
"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican,
a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (If Republican or Democrat)
Would you call yourself a strong Republican/Democrat or a not
very strong Republican/Democrat? (Independent, Other, or No
Preference) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or
Democratic party?" Coding: 0 if strong Democrat, 1 if weak Democrat, 2 if Independent-Democrat, 3 if Independent-neither, 4 if
Independent-Republican, 5 if weak Republican, 6 if strong Republican.
APPENDIXB
Z-TESTS FOR COMPARING PROPORTIONS

As noted in the text, the statistical test employed in this analysis is the
z-test for the comparison of two independent proportions . Here I describe the actual hypotheses tested and record the calculated z-scores .
Asterisks indicate statistical significance in the direction expected by
the alternate hypothesis at the following levels:
* <.10
j = <.05
t = <.01
Hypothesis 1 vs. Hypothesis 2: A one-tailed test with the revised theory's expectation serving as the null hypothesis (HO) and the original
theory's expectation as the alternate hypothesis (HI).
Ho : 1tpr = nM

H 1: 1tpr > 1tM

T H E J OU RNA L OF P OLITI CAL SCIE N CE

CAMPBELLV. CAMPBELL

39

where nPr is the proportion of Independents in the presidential-year
electorate and nM is the proportion of Independents in the midterm
electorate.
1956-58: z = 0.45
1972-74: z = 0.49
1992-94: z = 0.00
Hypothesis IA vs. Hypothesis 2A: A one-tailed test with the revised
theory's expectation serving as the null hypothesis and the original theory's expectation as the alternate hypothesis.
HO:1tP=nC
Hl: nP > nC
where nP is the proportion of Independents among peripheral voters
and nC is the proportion of Independents among core voters.
1956-58: z = l.72j
1972-74: z = 2.19j
1992-94: z = 1.30*
Hypothesis 3: A one-tailed test in which the revised theory's expectation represents the alternate hypothesis.
HO:1tPr=1tM
Hl: 1tPr>1tM
where nPr is the proportion of advantaged partisans in the presidentialyear electorate and nM is the proportion of advantaged partisans in the
midterm electorate.
1956-58: z = -0.41
1972-74: z = -1.00
1992-94: z = 0.34
Hypothesis 3A: A one-tailed test in which the revised theory's expectation represents the alternate hypothesis.
Ho:1tP= 1tC
Hl: 1tP> nC
where nP is the proportion of advantaged partisans among peripheral
voters and nC is the proportion of advantaged partisans among core
voters.
1956-58: ~ = -1.23
1972-74: z = -2.79
1992-94: z = 0.45
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Hypothesis 4: A one-tailed test in which the revised theory 's expectation represents the alternate hypothesis.
HO: 1tPr= 1tM
HI: 1tPr<1tM
where nPr is the proportion of disadvantaged partisans in the presidential-year electorate and nM is the proportion of disadvantaged partisans
in the midterm electorate.
1956-58 : z = 0.00
1972-74: z = 0.00
1992-94 : z = -0.35
Hypothesis 4A: A one-tailed test in which the revised theory's expectation represents the alternate hypothesis .
HO: 1tP= 1tC
HI: 1tP<1tC
where 1tP is the proportion of disadvantaged partisans among peripheral
voters and nC is the proportion of disadvantaged partisans among core
voters.
1956-58: z = -0.45
1972-74: z = 0.31
1992-94: z = -l.94j
Hypothesis 5 v. Hypothesis 8: A one-tailed test with the revised theory's expectation serving as the null hypothesis and the original theory's expectation as the alternate hypothesis.
HO: 1tP = 1tC
HI : 1tP >1tC
where 1tP is the proportion of peripheral voters defecting and nC is the
proportion of core voters defecting .

presidential election
1956: z = 1.39*
1972: z = 1.04
1992 ("pure" defection): z = 0.70
1992 (all defection): z = 1.81j

congressional elections
1956: z = -0.95
1972: z = -0.27
1992: z = 1.40*
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Hypothesis 6 v. Hypothesis 9: A one-tailed test with the revised theory's expectation serving as the null hypothesis and the original theory's expectation as the alternate hypothesis.
HO: 1tD = rr.A
Hl: 1tD > 1tA
where 1tD is the proportion of disadvantaged partisans defecting and 7t
A is the proportion of advantaged partisans defecting.
presidential election
1956: z = 8.07!
1972: z = 14.971
1992 ("pure" defection) : z = 0.00
1992 (all defection): z = 2.34*

congressional elections
1956: z = .11
1972: z = -1.27
1992: z = 2.58!

Hypothesis 7 vs. Hypothesis 10: A one-tailed test with the revised
theory's expectation serving as the null hypothesis and the original
theory's expectation as the alternate hypothesis.
HO: rr.Pr=1tM
Hl: 1tPr>rr.M
where nPr is the proportion of voters defecting in presidential years and
nM is the proportion of voters defecting in midterms .
1956-58: z = -2.54
1972-74: z = 0.00
1992-94: z = 1.54*
Hypothesis 11: A one-tailed test in which the expectation is represented by the alternate hypothesis.
HO: 1tPr=rr.M
Ht: 1tPr>rr.M
where 1tPr is the proportion of Independents voting for candidates of
the president's party in presidential years and 1tM is the proportion of
Independents voting for candidates of the president's party in midterms.
1956-58: z = 1.48*
1972-74: z = 0.93
1992-94: z = l .97t
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Hypothesis 12: A one-tailed test in which the expectation is represented by the alternate hypothesis .
HO: 11:P=1tC
HI: 11:P>1tC
where 1tP is the proportion of peripheral voters voting for candidates of
the president's party and 11:Cis the proportion of core voters voting for
candidates of the president's party .
presidential election
1956: z = 1.39*
1972: z = -1.83
1992 ("pure" vote%) : z = 0.00
1992 (2-party vote%): z = 1.12

congressional elections
1956: z = 0.42
1972: z = -0.52
1992: z= 0.91
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